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Abstract
A hallmark of human language is the ability to effectively and
efficiently convey contextually relevant information. One the-
ory for how humans reason about language is presented in the
Rational Speech Acts (RSA) framework, which captures prag-
matic phenomena via a process of recursive social reasoning
(Goodman & Frank, 2016). However, RSA represents ideal
reasoning in an unconstrained setting. We explore the idea that
speakers might learn to amortize the cost of RSA computation
over time by directly optimizing for successful communication
with an internal listener model. In simulations with grounded
neural speakers and listeners across two communication game
datasets representing synthetic and human-generated data, we
find that our amortized model is able to quickly generate lan-
guage that is effective and concise across a range of contexts,
without the need for explicit pragmatic reasoning.
Keywords: reference, pragmatics, rational speech acts, emer-
gent communication
Introduction
When we refer to an object or situation using natural lan-
guage, we easily generate an utterance that achieves a use-
ful amount of information in the given context. Counterfac-
tual reasoning about alternative utterances has been central to
explanations of these pragmatic aspects of language (Grice,
1975; Searle, 1969). Yet these theories entail computations
that appear slow and burdensome as cognitive processes, so
how do we produce pragmatic utterances so easily?
One popular computational account of pragmatic reason-
ing is the Rational Speech Acts (RSA) model (Goodman &
Frank, 2016). In RSA, speakers and listeners reason about
the meaning of utterances by considering the other utterances
that could have been produced, thus arriving at pragmatic in-
terpretations that enrich literal semantics. In addition to refer-
ring expression generation (Frank & Goodman, 2012; Degen,
Hawkins, Graf, Kreiss, & Goodman, 2020), RSA has seen
success in modeling a wide variety of phenomena, including
scalar implicature, metaphor, hyperbole, and politeness (for a
review, see Goodman & Frank, 2016).
However, the successes of RSA have been in describ-
ing pragmatic language competence. In other words, within
Marr’s (1976) levels of analysis, RSA is a computational ac-
count of human language, describing only what is to be ide-
ally computed, and not how humans produce language with
limited resources. Indeed, the full computation specified by
RSA involves reasoning over all possible utterances in con-
text, which is intractable in all but the most trivial settings.
Figure 1: Reference game: Three images including one target
(indicated by a gold box) are given to a speaker and listener.
The speaker produces an utterance for the listener who then
must choose the target image. In RSA, the speaker explic-
itly reasons about the listener’s interpretation of alternative
utterances; in our amortized model, the speaker is trained to
generate informative utterances without such reasoning.
Moreover, such computation is wasteful in that it is memo-
ryless, and does not leverage past experience (Gershman &
Goodman, 2014).
The impracticality of explicit pragmatic reasoning has had
implications for both theory and modeling. Linguists have
argued that pragmatic phenomena such as scalar implicature
(Levinson, 2000) and metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 2008) are
conventionalized, becoming the default interpretation of ut-
terances unless specifically cancelled by the speaker. Others
have argued that during pragmatic reasoning, listeners may
only consider a subset of relevant interpretations (Sperber &
Wilson, 1986; Fox & Katzir, 2011), or trade off between
“slow” and “fast” processes (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2019). In
natural language processing, RSA-based models for prag-
matic referring expression generation use approximate in-
ference methods, either sampling a subset of possible utter-
ances from a learned model (Andreas & Klein, 2016; Mon-
roe, Hawkins, Goodman, & Potts, 2017) or reasoning incre-
mentally (Cohn-Gordon, Goodman, & Potts, 2019). Others
use heuristics inspired from the psycholinguistics literature,
with greedy and probabilistic search techniques to reduce the
space of possible utterances (Krahmer & Van Deemter, 2012;
van Gompel, van Deemter, Gatt, Snoeren, & Krahmer, 2019).
Given limited time and resources, it is indeed unlikely that
we do exhaustive Bayesian reasoning every time we speak.
An alternative is that experience with this slower reason-
ing process has led to amortized “habits of speech” that we
use most of the time (Gershman & Goodman, 2014). In
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this paper, we model this hypothesis through grounded lan-
guage models that are trained with listeners in Lewis (1969)-
style communication games (Fig. 1), measuring the degree
to which they learn to speak pragmatically. Our models are
able to acquire desirable pragmatic behavior while being far
more efficient than naive RSA-based approaches. This sug-
gests that agents can internalize pragmatic language produc-
tion processes, providing a plausible algorithmic account of
human language production in resource-constrained settings
and a promising avenue for the development of more efficient
pragmatic language models.
How to Speak Informatively
We explore communication within Lewis-style signalling
games (1969) which allow us to analyze language use in
grounded contexts. Formally, a reference game (I, t) consists
of a set of N images I = (I1, . . . , In), with one target image It
known only to the speaker. The speaker’s job is to produce
an utterance u which, when given to the listener, causes the
listener to correctly identify t (Fig. 1). Crucially, the ideal
language for image It changes depending on context. For ex-
ample, in Fig. 1, it is not sufficient to simply say the color
(“red”) or shape (“square”) of the target image; both must be
provided to be unambiguous.
We consider a variety of speakers in this setting, each
capturing different cognitive hypotheses about utterance pro-
duction. The baseline naive speaker is a neural captioning
model trained to generate observed descriptions of an image,
completely ignoring context. To incorporate pragmatics, the
naive speaker can be provided context objects as input, which
we call the contextual speaker. In contrast, RSA-based
speakers explicitly consider alternative utterances: the gold-
standard Full RSA model does the complete reasoning pro-
cess specified by RSA theory; the sample-rerank model ap-
proximates RSA by using a naive speaker to generate candi-
date utterances, reducing the space of alternatives. Our amor-
tized speaker takes a different approach, training a context-
aware language model with the RSA communication objec-
tive, without any pragmatic reasoning. The model is trained
directly via backpropagation through a (white-box) internal
listener model. In contrast, we also consider a REINFORCE
speaker which learns from a sparser communicative reward
signal given by a (black-box) external listener.
Naive speaker. The naive speaker S0 is a standard image
captioning (IC) model trained to generate referring expres-
sions that completely ignore context. Given a reference game
(I, t), S0 embeds It with a convolutional neural network fS,
and uses this embedding to initialize a recurrent neural net-
work decoder (RNN-IC) which provides a probability distri-
bution over utterances u:
S0(u | I, t) = pRNN-IC(u | fS(It)). (1)
RNN-IC is trained with a standard language modeling objec-
tive with teacher forcing: given an image I and ground-truth
utterance u, the loss of a predicted caption uˆ is
LS0(uˆ,u) =∑
t
pRNN-IC(uˆt = ut | u<t ; fS(It)). (2)
Contextual speaker. The simplest way of incorporating
context-sensitivity into S0 is to condition it on the entire set of
images I as opposed to just It . Given the same vision model
fS, let ct be the embedding of the target image: ct = fS(It).
Let ct ′1 and ct ′2 be embeddings of the distractor images for
t ′i 6= t: i.e. ct ′1 = fS(It ′1). Then our contextual speaker S′0 is
trained identically to S0, except it is conditioned on the con-
catenation of all three embeddings:
S′0(u | I, t) = pRNN-IC(u | ct ;c−t ′1 ;c−t ′2). (3)
RSA speakers
RSA speakers generate utterances with the goals of accurate
and efficient communication. Accuracy is based on how a
pretrained internal listener model L0 will interpret the utter-
ance. Given a reference game I and a speaker utterance u, L0
represents the probability of target t as proportional to the dot
product between embeddings of It and u:
L0(t | I,u) ∝ exp( fL(It)ᵀg(u)) , (4)
where fL is a CNN encoder (with the same architecture as
fS) and g is an RNN encoder. These encoders will be trained
from observed target-utterance pairs.
The speaker SRSA then chooses an utterance u which max-
imizes the probability of the listener identifying t, while also
balancing the cost of the utterance C(u):
SRSA(u | I, t) ∝ exp(logL0(t | I,u)−C(u)) . (5)
When we can enumerate all possible utterances U, we can
compute Eq. 5 exactly, picking argmaxu∈U SRSA(u | I, t); we
call this model Full RSA (SRSA-Full) and treat it as an upper
bound on the pragmatic quality of a speaker model. How-
ever, in many cases, there are an unbounded number of ut-
terances to consider. Past work (Andreas & Klein, 2016;
Monroe et al., 2017) uses the naive speaker S0 as a pro-
posal distribution from which a subset of M utterances U′ =
(u′1, . . . ,u
′
M) is sampled; exact inference is then performed
with this subset. Since this involves sampling candidate
utterances from S0 then reranking them based on commu-
nicative utility, we refer to these approximations as sample-
rerank models (SRSA-SRR). For both models, our cost func-
tion C(u) is simply a penalty linear in the length of the utter-
ance: C(u) = λ‖u‖. We used a constant λ = 1 for SRSA-SRR,
λ = 0.0001 for SRSA-Full, and λ = 0.01 for SRSA-Am, and for
SRSA-SRR, set M = 5.1
1Increasing M resulted in little performance benefit.
Learning to produce informative utterances
Both versions of RSA speakers described so far generate in-
formative utterances by explicitly considering alternatives,
which can be slow and expensive. We next describe a model
that amortizes this cost, learning to produce the utterances
that RSA would prefer, without needing to explicitly consider
alternatives at neither train nor test time.
Our amortized speaker SRSA-Am has the same architecture
as the naive contextual model S′0, generating an utterance after
encoding the target and distractors:
SRSA-Am(u | I, t) = pRNN(u | ct ;c−t ′1 ;c−t ′2) (6)
However, while S′0 is trained as an IC model to match ob-
served utterances, SRSA-Am is trained to directly optimize the
RSA objective. Specifically, define the loss of a sampled cap-
tion uˆ as the listener surprisal plus the cost of the utterance:
LSRSA-Am(uˆ | I, t) =− logL0(t | I, uˆ)+C(uˆ). (7)
Equation 7 looks similar to the RSA objective, Equation 5,
but crucially omits the normalization term. This means we
do not have to consider alternative utterances when training
the model: for a fixed, pre-trained internal listener model L0,
each optimization step consists of sampling an utterance from
SRSA-Am, evaluating the listener model, then updating the pa-
rameters to minimize LRSA-Am. Note that unlike S′0, utter-
ances are evaluated solely via communicative utility, and not
compared to observed language.
A technical problem with training this model is the need
to estimate the gradient of LRSA-Am given discrete sequences
sampled by our speaker. We use the Gumbel-Softmax trick
(Jang, Gu, & Poole, 2017), which gives differentiable “sam-
ples” from a categorical distribution by adding Gumbel noise
and applying a softmax with a temperature τ. To ensure
that L0 receives discrete inputs, we use the (biased) straight-
through estimator: the utterance is discretized in the forward
pass, but treated as the original continuous sample in the
backwards pass. A constant τ= 1 allowed our models to train
successfully. Our differentiable cost function C(u) is imple-
mented as a penalty on not predicting the end of sentence
token, which increases by λ after each sampled token.
SRSA-Am has an introspectable internal listener model that
can be used for explicit pragmatic reasoning. Importantly,
this means that the speaker model receives subtle word-by-
word supervision during training. An alternative is an agent
that has no internal listener model, but still attempts to max-
imize communication success by trial and error. We thus
consider a reinforcement learning model, the REINFORCE
speaker, SRL, which is architecturally identical to SRSA-Am,
but trained with a black-box reward function rather than an
explicit internal listener. A discrete utterance uˆ is sampled
from SRL as before. We simulate a referent choice from an
external listener by selecting tˆ = argmaxt L0(t | I, uˆ). SRL re-
ceives a reward of +1 if the listener identifies the correct tar-
Figure 2: Example reference games with ideal utterances.
get and 0 otherwise2. The weights of SRL are then updated via
the REINFORCE gradient estimator (Williams, 1992). From
a reinforcement learning perspective, SRL and SRSA-Am have
the same objective, but the former is model-free while the
latter is model-based, with RSA as the model of communica-
tion.
Experiments
Datasets
We run experiments on two reference game datasets repre-
senting synthetic and human-generated data. ShapeWorld
(Kuhnle & Copestake, 2017) is an artificial dataset where
each game consists a set of three images, each containing a
single random shape with random color. Each game varies
in the informativity of the utterance required for successful
communication: either only the shape or color is sufficient, or
both are needed (Fig. 2). This allows us to evaluate how our
speakers modulate their utterances depending on the context.
Our primary ShapeWorld dataset has 76000 games contain-
ing artificially generated utterances with a total vocabulary of
15 words. Additionally, to test systematic generalization to
novel contexts, we constructed similar datasets where either
a color (red), shape (square), or set of color-shape combi-
nations (red circle, blue square, yellow ellipse, white circle,
gray square) were held-out during training, but presented as
targets in every test game.
Colors (Monroe et al., 2017) is a reference game dataset
with real human language, where human speakers saw three
patches of color and were asked to produce utterances that
uniquely identify a target color. Here, contexts varied in
their difficulty: either distractors were perceptually distinct
from the target image (far) or were similar in color space
(close) (Fig. 3). The language used in the ∼46000 games in
this dataset is considerably more complex, with around 1400
unique vocabulary tokens; thus, reasoning over all possible
utterances (as required by Full RSA) is infeasible.
2This is equivalent to stochastically sampling a reward from the
RSA listener with a very low softmax temperature. A higher tem-
perature led to more variance during training and overall worse per-
formance.
Figure 3: Output examples for ShapeWorld and Colors.
Training and Model Details
We split each dataset into a training, validation, and test split
of 60:15:1 on ShapeWorld and 42:3:1 on Colors. The train-
ing datasets for each task were further subdivided into thirds.
1/3 was used to train our speakers (and speaker-internal lis-
tener L0 if used). The second 1/3 of the training data was
used to train a validation listener: training was stopped af-
ter a speaker obtained maximum accuracy with this listener
on the validation set. Finally, the last 1/3 was used to train
evaluation listeners. The ultimate communicative accuracy
of speaker models was evaluated with these evaluation listen-
ers on the test set. These divisions ensured that speakers did
not overfit to a single listener, and instead were evaluated for
behavior that generalized across different listeners.
Models were trained for a maximum of 100 epochs with
the Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with a batch size
of 32 and a learning rate of 0.001 for speakers and 0.01 for
listeners. After training, the models with the highest vali-
dation accuracy were kept. RNNs (both encoders and de-
coders) are 100-d unidirectional Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU)
RNNs (Cho et al., 2014) with 50-d word embeddings learned
from scratch, except for the contextual speakers S′0, which
have hidden size 300-d (since they consume 3 embeddings).
The vision modules fS and fL are CNNs with 4 blocks, each
block containing a 64-filter 3x3 convolutional layer, batch
normalization, ReLU activation, and 2x2 max pooling. Given
shapes and colors represented as 64× 64× 3 input images,
this produces 1024-d representations. In speakers, these are
projected via a linear layer down to the GRU hidden size
to initialize the GRU; for listeners, to compare image and
text embeddings, we project the text representation into the
1024-d image space via a linear layer and use dot product
to produce the target probability. Our code is available at
https://github.com/juliaiwhite/amortized-rsa.
Results
We evaluate our speakers’ utterances (see Fig. 3 for exam-
ples) in several ways. First, language should be effective: it
should serve its communicative goal of helping the listener
correctly identify the target image. We measure communica-
tion success with our evaluation listeners on unseen reference
games. Second, language should be concise, saying as much
as needed, but no more. We measure this by examining how
the length and content of the utterance changes depending
on the difficulty of the contexts as specified in either dataset.
Finally, language should be conventional: to cause minimal
confusion to a listener, it should look like conventional, gram-
matical English. Because the ShapeWorld dataset uses com-
pletely artificial language, we measure conventionality on the
Colors dataset only.3 As an imperfect proxy to convention-
ality, we measure the per-word probability of the utterances
generated from our speakers, as reported by an unconditional
language model trained on utterances in the training data.4
Efficacy. All speaker models, except for the REINFORCE
model SRL, perform well above chance on both test datasets
(Fig. 4) though there are significant differences between
them. The naive baseline S0 attains an accuracy of 73% for
ShapeWorld and 67% for Colors. While the additional con-
text given to S′0 results in some improvement, more substan-
tial benefits come when models use pragmatic objectives. The
sample-rerank model SRSA-SRR obtains much higher accuracy,
only slightly behind SRSA-Full in ShapeWorld and even out-
performing the human utterances in Colors.5 Most notably,
3RSA and Amortized models used coherent one word utterances,
e.g. “blue”, which due to the artificial nature of the dataset, did not
exist in the training data (which had only “blue shape”). Thus, they
had extremely low probability, making this evaluation nonsensical.
4Per-word probability avoids confounds with utterance length.
5Human utterance accuracy is imperfect because utterances are
evaluated with respect to a neural listener, not a human listener. Our
listener model is an imperfect approximation for a human listener,
Figure 4: Efficacy. Accuracy for ShapeWorld (for 9 evalu-
ation listeners) and Colors (for 1 evaluation listener). Error
bars correspond to the 95% confidence intervals across the
test games for all figures.
our amortized model SRSA-Am also performs very well, per-
forming on par with SRSA-SRR in ShapeWorld and achieving
the highest accuracy (94%) out of all the models tested for
Colors. Meanwhile, the REINFORCE model SRL struggles;
it performs on par with S0 for ShapeWorld and is unable to
learn in the Colors setting.
Figure 5: Concision. Average utterance lengths produced un-
der different contexts for ShapeWorld and Colors. For Shape-
world, utterance length is split into the average number of
colors, shapes, and other tokens (which include the unknown
token, ”<UNK>”, and generic term ”shape”) .
Concision. We quantify concision by measuring the
speaker’s average utterance lengths for the different contexts
but is still a reasonable measure of efficacy given that we measure
accuracy across multiple separately-trained listeners.
of our reference game (Fig. 5). Analyzing utterance length
within context, we see that RSA SRSA-Full and the amortized
model SRSA-Am exhibit appropriately longer utterance lengths
when both the shape and color are needed to identify the tar-
get image as opposed to either component separately. Look-
ing more specifically at how the number of color and shape
words per utterance differ based on the context, we see that
in contexts where the shape is required, these models are less
likely to say a color and vice versa.6 This behavior is not re-
flected at all in the naive speaker S0, and is less pronounced
in the contextual (S′0) and sample-rerank (SRSA-SRR) models.
In Colors, we see that humans tailor utterance length to game
difficulty: for the difficult “close” contexts where colors were
the same shade, utterances tended to be longer than the eas-
ier “far” contexts. Here, only the contextual speaker S′0 and
amortized model SRSA-Am demonstrate a similar significant
difference in utterance length.
Figure 6: Conventionality. Average per-word probability of
an utterance for Colors.
Conventionality. Finally, we quantify the extent to which
generated utterances reflect conventional language, with an
unconditional language model trained on human utterances
from the Colors dataset. We explore the probability per word
of utterances generated by our speaker models (Fig. 6). Un-
surprisingly, the naive S0 and contextual speakers S′0, which
are trained with language-modeling objectives, have high
probability. The sample re-rank model SRSA-SRR sees a ma-
jor decrease in probability, as it re-ranks sampled utterances
with respect to an internal listener, which does not necessarily
favor the most probable utterance.
The amortized model SRSA-Am is lower still: the commu-
nicative training objective results in language drift (see Fig. 3
for examples) whereby the model is able to sacrifice real-
ism for communicative efficacy; this has been reported in
similarly trained models (Lazaridou, Potapenko, & Tieleman,
2020). It is unclear whether this reflects creative and accept-
able, but unconventional, use of language, or malformed lan-
guage that would be hard for humans to understand. Regard-
less, the language is not overfit to the amortized speaker’s
6Both RSA and amortized models also capture the well-attested
tendency of humans to produce colors more often than shapes, all
else being equal. This in turn follows from properties of the neural
listener: a CNN is more accurate at detecting colors than shapes.
internal listener, given its ability to generalize to listeners
trained on separate data.
Figure 7: Inference Speed. Average time to generate an ut-
terance for ShapeWorld.
Figure 8: Generalization. Accuracy for ShapeWorld when
generalizing to a held-out color, shape, or color-shape com-
bination.
Inference Speed. Fig. 7 depicts average utterance genera-
tion time across 100 games for ShapeWorld. S0, S′0, SRSA-Am,
and SRL are similarly fast, since they require only a single
sample from an RNN. In contrast, SRSA-Full and SRSA-SRR
must evaluate a listener across many utterances, resulting in
much higher inference times. While these results are merely
suggestive—our RSA models can likely be optimized—they
point to the large gap in compute requirements between on-
line pragmatic reasoning and amortized utterance production.
Generalization. Fig. 8 displays communication accuracy
on the dataset variants with held-out colors, shapes, or com-
binations. The amortized model comes closest to the perfor-
mance of Full RSA, followed by the sample-rerank and RE-
INFORCE models. The contextual captioner’s poor perfor-
mance here likely indicates that, where it captures pragmatic
behavior, it does so primarily by memorization. This indi-
cates that communication-based training is needed to produce
pragmatic language in novel contexts.
Conclusion and Discussion
We explored several models for speech production in refer-
ence games and evaluated them with respect to pragmatic ef-
ficiency, concision, conventionality, and processing time. The
Full RSA model represents the gold standard at a competence
level, capturing nuances of pragmatic behavior and general-
izing well. But it requires large, often intractable, processing
costs. In contrast, our amortized RSA model achieves perfor-
mance close to Full RSA, while being far more efficient.
The contextual speaker, S′0, performs poorly with respect to
efficacy and concision, though well with respect to conven-
tion. Because the contextual model matches our amortized
model in architecture but uses a language modeling objective,
we conclude that some aspects of pragmatic communication
are unattainable by simply observing surface-level linguistic
cues. Despite recent work showing that language models may
implicitly learn pragmatic phenomena from sufficient data
(Schuster, Chen, & Degen, 2020), our simulations suggest
that communication-based training is required for successful
pragmatic communication, especially when generalizing to
situations that have not been seen in the training distribution.
The reinforcement learning approach provides a complemen-
tary contrast: it shared the communicative objective with the
RSA models, but was forced to learn from the weaker signal
of communicative success or failure. The poor performance
of this model suggests that an internal model of the listener
greatly helps communication-based training.
While common pragmatic behaviors may be amortized,
our model must still learn from experience; highly novel situ-
ations may still require the full reasoning processes afforded
by frameworks like RSA. Indeed, empirical evidence reports
significant variability in processing time across instances of
a pragmatic phenomenon (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015). To
better model this variability, one interesting extension of the
work presented here is a model which reverts from amortized
computation back to more sophisticated reasoning procedures
in novel situations. Such a model would operationalize the
trade-off between slow explicit reasoning processes and fast
amortized computation that motivates recent theories of lan-
guage processing (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2019) and amortized
probabilistic inference (Gershman & Goodman, 2014).
An intriguing connection is to models of emergent com-
munication (Lazaridou, Peysakhovich, & Baroni, 2017; Mor-
datch & Abbeel, 2018; Lazaridou et al., 2020). In order to
ground our amortized speaker in actual language, the listener
is pre-trained on real language and fixed. In most emergent
communication models, either speaker and listener are co-
trained from scratch, or in an attempt to ground the commu-
nication protocol, the speaker is pre-trained and/or given aux-
iliary language grounding tasks (Lazaridou et al., 2017).
In this paper we described an algorithmic model that forms
“habits of pragmatic speech”, internalizing the explicit prag-
matic reasoning of Rational Speech Acts models into a fast
but flexible speaker. This represents one solution to the puz-
zle of pragmatic speech: How do we produce pragmatically
useful utterances so easily and quickly?
Acknowledgments
We thank anonymous reviewers and Christopher Potts for in-
sightful comments. This research was supported in part by
DARPA under agreement FA8650-19-C-7923, an NSF Grad-
uate Research Fellowship for JM, and the Office of Naval Re-
search grant ONR MURI N00014-16-1-2007.
References
Andreas, J., & Klein, D. (2016). Reasoning about pragmatics
with neural listeners and speakers. In Proceedings of the
2016 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Lan-
guage Processing (EMNLP) (pp. 1173–1182).
Cho, K., van Merrie¨nboer, B., Gulcehre, C., Bahdanau, D.,
Bougares, F., Schwenk, H., & Bengio, Y. (2014). Learning
phrase representations using rnn encoder–decoder for sta-
tistical machine translation. In Proceedings of the 2014
Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language
Processing (EMNLP) (pp. 1724–1734).
Cohn-Gordon, R., Goodman, N., & Potts, C. (2019). An
incremental iterated response model of pragmatics. In
Proceedings of the Society for Computation in Linguistics
(SCiL) 2019 (pp. 81–90).
Degen, J., Hawkins, R. D., Graf, C., Kreiss, E., & Goodman,
N. D. (2020). When redundancy is useful: A bayesian ap-
proach to overinformative referring expressions. Psycho-
logical Review.
Degen, J., & Tanenhaus, M. K. (2015). Processing scalar im-
plicature: A constraint-based approach. Cognitive Science,
39(4), 667–710.
Degen, J., & Tanenhaus, M. K. (2019). Constraint-based
pragmatic processing. In The Oxford handbook of experi-
mental semantics and pragmatics.
Fox, D., & Katzir, R. (2011). On the characterization of
alternatives. Natural Language Semantics, 19(1), 87–107.
Frank, M. C., & Goodman, N. D. (2012). Predicting prag-
matic reasoning in language games. Science, 336(6084),
998–998.
Gershman, S., & Goodman, N. (2014). Amortized infer-
ence in probabilistic reasoning. In Proceedings of the An-
nual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (CogSci)
(Vol. 36).
Goodman, N. D., & Frank, M. C. (2016). Pragmatic lan-
guage interpretation as probabilistic inference. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 20(11), 818-829.
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole &
J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and semantics: Vol. 3: Speech
acts. New York: Academic Press.
Jang, E., Gu, S., & Poole, B. (2017). Categorical reparameter-
ization with gumbel-softmax. In International Conference
on Learning Representations (ICLR).
Kingma, D. P., & Ba, J. (2014). Adam: A method for stochas-
tic optimization. In International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR).
Krahmer, E., & Van Deemter, K. (2012). Computational gen-
eration of referring expressions: A survey. Computational
Linguistics, 38(1), 173–218.
Kuhnle, A., & Copestake, A. (2017). ShapeWorld - a new
test methodology for multimodal language understanding.
arXiv preprint. doi: arXiv:1704.04517
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (2008). Metaphors we live by.
University of Chicago Press.
Lazaridou, A., Peysakhovich, A., & Baroni, M. (2017).
Multi-agent cooperation and the emergence of (natural)
language. In International Conference on Learning Rep-
resentations (ICLR).
Lazaridou, A., Potapenko, A., & Tieleman, O. (2020). Multi-
agent communication meets natural language: Synergies
between functional and structural language learning. In
Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association
for Computational Linguistics (ACL).
Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive meanings: The theory
of generalized conversational implicature. MIT Press.
Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A philosophical study. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Marr, D., & Poggio, T. (1976). From understanding com-
putation to understanding neural circuitry. Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Artificial Intelligence Laboratory.
Monroe, W., Hawkins, R. X. D., Goodman, N. D., & Potts,
C. (2017). Colors in context: A pragmatic neural model
for grounded language understanding. Transactions of the
Association for Computational Linguistics (TACL), 5, 325–
338.
Mordatch, I., & Abbeel, P. (2018). Emergence of grounded
compositional language in multi-agent populations. In
Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Schuster, S., Chen, Y., & Degen, J. (2020). Harnessing the
richness of the linguistic signal in predicting pragmatic in-
ferences. In Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the
Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL).
Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy
of language (Vol. 626). Cambridge University Press.
Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance: Communica-
tion and cognition (Vol. 142). Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
van Gompel, R. P., van Deemter, K., Gatt, A., Snoeren, R., &
Krahmer, E. J. (2019). Conceptualization in reference pro-
duction: Probabilistic modeling and experimental testing.
Psychological Review, 126(3), 345.
Williams, R. J. (1992). Simple statistical gradient-following
algorithms for connectionist reinforcement learning. Ma-
chine learning, 8(3-4), 229–256.
